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NOTES
RES IPSA LoQUITUR IN AIR

LAw.-A recent case suggests the applicability of the

doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents and thus raises occasion for
speculation as to the future development of the law in this direction. In Sollak v.
New York,' plaintiff recovered for personal injuries received in a collision between
an airplane and an automobile. The evidence disclosed that while the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was proceeding along a public highway near a
flying field, a plane operated by defendant's officer collided with the automobile
producing the injuries complained of. This, together with proof of the nature
and extent of the injuries constituted all the evidence. Plaintiff contended that
in the absence of any explanation on the part of the state as to how the collision
occurred, the doctrine of res ipsa loguitur must be applied. It seems that the
,
doctrine was applied.
Investigation discloses no other case where the doctrine has been successfully
resorted to by plaintiff to establish defendant's liability for injuries received in an
airplane accident. It will be remembered that it is only where the action is
founded on negligence that the problem is presented. Where the action is based
upon some breach of a positive duty other than the duty to exercise care, it is
inapplicable. In actions for damage to person or property caused by flying over
land of another, there is an absolute liability imposed both by the common law 2
and by the Uniform State Statute. 3 In actions for injuries to spectators at public
exhibitions, those responsible for the exhibition may be liable for the breach of
some duty imposed by statute or ordinance or for a failure to provide a reason4
safe place for the invitees.
ably In
Seaman v. CurtissFlying Service,s recovery was denied in
an action brought
for the death of plaintiff's intestate caused by defendant's negligence. The evidence disclosed that the deceased was riding in defendant's plane, operated by
defendant's pilot when the plane went into a nose dive and crashed. There was
apparently some evidence of negligent operation of the plane and some evidence
tending to show that it had been carefully operated and that the accident was
caused by an act of God, viz., an air pocket which a reasonably prudent pilot
could not foresee. There were the ordinary instructions to the jury placing the
burden of obtaining an affirmative verdict on both the issue of negligence and
the issue of cause. The jury found for the defendant.
Nothing was said in this case about the doctrine of res ipsa loguiturand it appeared that plaintiff relied upon proof of specific acts of negligence. While this
would prevent him from relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loguitlurin some few
jurisdictions, 6 it would not bar the application of that doctrine under the rule
11929 U. S. Av. R. 42 (N. Y. Ct. Cl. 1927).
'See POLLOCK, TORTS (13th ed.) 361 ff.
3Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, § 5.
4
Platt v. Erie County Agriculture Society, 164,App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. Supp.
520, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 116 (1914).
661929 U. S. Av. R. 48 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk Co., Trial Term, 1929.
Kennedy v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 128 Mo. 297, 107 S. W. 16 (1907); Bogress v. Wabash R. R. Co., 266 S. W. 333 (Mo. App. 1924).
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applied in most courts.7 The case got to the jury, it is true, and where the effect of
res ipsa is merely to make out a jury case,' it would be immaterial here. Where it
required defendant to come forward with evidence tending to e.xplan the acci-

dent or, as in some jurisdictions where it cast upon defendant the burden of
proving due care,10 its application might have produced a different result. Were
evidence required from defendant of due care, plaintiff would be entitled to a
direction in case of failure by defendant to produce such proof."i Were the burden of proof cast on defendant, plaintiff would be entitled to a direction in case
of a failure by defendant to offer any proof, and in any event plaintiff would be
entitled to an instruction that the jury must affirmatively find due care before it
could return a verdict for defendant.
Since the question of res ipsa was not presented, the case is no authority either
way. It was found that defendant was not a common carrier, but this would go
only to the degree of care required to avoid negligence and would not affect the
manner of proving negligence.

Here are two types of accidents that might raise the question of the application of the presumption of negligence involved in res ipsa loidlur: (I) accidents,
collisions, etc., resulting in injuries to person or propert, on the public highways,
as in the Solak case; (2) accidents resulting in the death or injury of passengers
in airplanes. The Sollak case apparently applies the doctrine in the first type.
The Seaman case apparently does not touch the question of its application.
Now the conditions for the application of this doctrine must not be lost sight
of. In the first place, the instrument or agency which is the occasion for the injury must be within the exclusive control of defendant, both at the time of the
injury and at the time of the alleged negligence.' 2 The reason for this is not far
to seek. Res ipsa loquitur actually raises a double presumption. It raises a presumption of negligence and a presumption that defendant's negligence was the
legal cause of the injury. The latter is sometimes deied,13 but what is actually
intended is that there is no presumption that defendant's acts were the cause in.
fact of the injury. 4 Now, if the instrument or agency which precipitated the
injury is not under the exclusive control of defendant, the basis for the presump-

tion of legal cause fails. The injury might just as readily be caused by the negli7
Walters v. Seattle R. &S. Ry. Co., 48 Wash. 233, 93 Pac. 419 (1903); Firszt v.
Capitol Park Realty Co., 198 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300 (1923): Washington-Virginia
Ry. Co. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S. E. 1032 (1912); McNamara v. Boston &
le. R. R. Co., 202 Mass. 991, 89 N. E. 131 (1909); Clarke v. Nassau Electric Ry. Co.,
9 App. Div. 51, 41 N. Y. Supp. 78 (1896).
"Ross v. Double Shoals Cotton Mills, 140 N. C. 115, 52 S. E. 121 (1905); Duna
v. Roper Lumber Co., 172 N. C. 129, 90 S. E. 18 (1916). See Harper and Heckel,

Effect of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur (1928) 22 ILL. L. Rnv. 724, 732 ff.
'See Slater v. Barnes, 241 N. Y. 284, 149 N. E. 859 (1925). But see Griffin v.
Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925 (1901). See Harper and Heckel, supranote 8, at
734. 10

Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Bruce, 89 Ark. S89, 117 S. . 56 (1909);
Warren v. Mo. &Kan. Tel. Co., 196 Mo. App. 549, 196 S. W. 1030 (1917).
x"See
Harper and Heckel, supra note 8, at 738 ff.
l92Sandler v. Garrison, 249 N. Y. 236, 164 N. E. 36 (1928).
'4Pittsburg C. C. & St. L. v. Arnott, 189 Ind. 350. 369, 126 N. E. 13 (1920).
1See Scellars v. Universal Service Everywhere, 6S Cal. App. 252, 228 Pac. 879
(1924).
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gence of a third party as by defendant's presumed negligence.6 Where the inferences will support the one as well as the other hypothesis, the usual and general
rule applies and plaintiff must make out a prima facie case by actual proof. In
other words, the orthodox rule as to circumstantial evidence applies and plaintiff
is deprived of the specific presumption which made proof of the accident under
the circumstances sufficient to constitute a jury case.16
In the next place, the doctrine of res ipsa is based upon the theory and is confined to situations of such a nature that the negligence of the defendant is the
most reasonable explanation of the accident. The leading English case', involved
a claim for damages for an injury sustained by a barrel falling from a window
above the sidewalk. There was no evidence of negligence for the plaintiff knew
nothing except that he was struck by the falling object. It was held, however,
in the Exchequer that plaintiff need offer no proof of negligence to make out a
prinmfacie case. Barrels, thought the Chief Baron, did not roll out of warehouses
without negligence on the part of someone. In view, then, of the ordinary experience of mankind that such incidents are ordinarily the result of negligence,
the jury might so find on mere proof of the injury under the circumstances. If
there has in fact been no negligence on 8 the part of the defendant, he is required,
at least in some jurisdictions, to come forward with the evidence since the explanation of the accident lies solely within his or his servants' knowledge.
Are these conditions present in the two types of accidents mentioned above?
In both situations, the control and management of the airplane is exclusively
within defendant's power. If there has been any negligence, it is negligence for
which defendant is liable. In both situations, it would, no doubt, be fair to require the defendant to produce any evidence bearing on the question of due care,
since the facts are peculiarly within his knowledge or the knowledge of his servants.
As to the proposition that defendant's negligence is the most reasonable explanation of the accident, however, there is genuine doubt. In the type of situation illustrated by the Sollak case, it may very well be that a collision between
persons travelling on the public highway and an airplane would be extraordinary
without some negligence. Like the falling of the barrel, it would be rare unless
some one were at fault. It may be quite satisfactory, then, to apply res ipsa
loquitur here. But as to injuries to passengers, the situation is different. True,
the doctrine is regularly applied to accidents in which railroad passengers are
injured. 9 But here again, experience will support the law. Railroad accidents
are now rare unless someone is guilty of a neglect of duty. Science and industry
have surrounded rail travel with so many safeguards that one can confidently
look for a negligent employe or operator to explain most accidents.
It is certainly otherwise with respect to travel by air. The hazards are still
great and it probably is not true that most airplane accidents are due to some
"5See
Larrabie v. Des Moines Tent Co., 189 Iowa 319, 178 N. W. 373 (1920).
16 Cf. Harper and Harper, Establishing Railroad Liability for Fires (1929) 77 U.
oF PA. L. REv. 629, 630 ff.
1"7Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
See supra notes 9, 10.
u9See CLARK AND LiNDSEL, ToRTs (8th ed.) p. 450 ff.

NOTES
one's negligence. On the other hand, it is probably true that comparatively few
such accidents are due to negligence. Passengers know the hazards and know
well that the greatest ones are conditions which man and science have not yet
mastered. To apply the doctrine of res ipsa to this type of accident at the prezent
stage of the development of air travel, would seem to ignore the pragmatic bases
of the principle and subject those who operate aircraft to unduely severe liability.
Such an application would raise a presumption that defendant was negligent in
the operation of the craft and that such negligence was the legal cause of the
accident. Experience, to date, does not justify such a rule of liability. It assumes
that this explanation of the accident is more reasonable and more likely to be accurate than some other explanation, such as an air pocket, act of God, condition
of the atmosphere, or other causes. In the course of time when travel by air has
become as safe as travel by rail, and after man has mastered the hazards of this
method of transportation, it may very well be that the doctrine of res ipsaz
loMquitur will be properly applicable to this situation. At the present time, it is
submitted, it will be unjustifiable. The law will grow, but it should grow with the
development of the industry. It should not be viser than the experience of mankind.
Most important of all, there is as yet no particularly vital social policy involved in facilitating recovery on the part of those injured while passengers.
While it is obvious that defendants who operate aircraft should be held to a high
degree of care, there is no pressing need for raising presumptions against defendants. It is otherwise, however, when plaintiff is injured while making ordinary
use of the highway. Accordingly, it is submitted that the Solia case is sound and
that res ipsa loquitur should regularly apply in this type of case. But until
travel by air is much safer than it now is or until there is more necessity than
there now appears for protecting the public that travels by air, it would seem unsatisfactory to extend its application to the ordinary airplane accident.
FOWLER VNCENT HARPER
INDIANA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW

MuinIciPAL AIRPORT AS A PARK PtRosE.-Although the legislatures in the
various states, in response to what vwas at the time an apparently univer-al demand, have adequately conferred upon municipalities the requisite authority to
acquire and maintain airports, the actual realization of these powers in many
instances has not been entirely unopposed. This opposition, however, has not
always been based upon the absence of the power of the municipality in the particular case to establish an airport, but upon the attempt of the municipality to
establish an airport by indirectly invoking other delegated powers, such as the
power to establish parks.
Because of the various constitutional and statutory safeguards against the
unauthorized expenditure of public moneys and the improvident accumulation
of excessive indebtedness, the financing of a municipal airport program, in most
iurisdictions, depends primarily upon the consent of the qualified electors ob-

